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Abstract 
While de-Westernisation is an interesting political intervention in media theory, analytically 
it offers little. We critique this approach through six inter-related arguments. The first point 
of critique challenges the putative singularity of the West. The second line of enquiry raises 
questions about the emergence of new academic disciplines and their intellectual offerings. 
Our third point is that the call to de-Westernise Media Studies is naïve, ignores history and 
the long patterns of global interconnectedness that have mutually formed the West/Rest. The 
fourth argument is that “de-Westernisation” suggests that the theory and methods of Media 
Studies offer nothing of use outside their original birthplaces, while the fifth argument is the 
conceptual danger of nativism. The sixth critique centres on the problem of essentialising 
culture as a determinate object. Examining the contemporary media practices of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran, we suggest that the true alternative to a repressive theocracy is its internal 
challenge by women, students and other parts of civil society that offers a critical third way 
beyond the binary divide. 
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Within the academic field of Media Studies there is growing concern over Western 
parochialism and intellectual hegemony. Repeated calls for its internationalisation have 
managed to unsettle a number of assumptions and propositions, while calls for “de-
Westernisation” raise more complex issues. Our aim here is to probe the epistemological 
limitations of “de-Westernisation” as it is being applied to Media Studies, even as we accept 
some of its political intentions, and to propound a more nuanced approach to the study of the 
media in what is often referred to in a highly condensed manner as the “global South”.2 In 
addition, we explore how this rhetoric of “de-Westernisation” has been adopted by an 
authoritarian state in its actual political struggles against Western hegemony. Here, our 
specific focus will be the media environment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, although we 
                                                
1 We would like to acknowledge the critical readings of our paper by Mark Hobart and John 
Downing; any remaining errors are ours alone. 
2 We are aware of the risks of using such a term, that such a geographic synecdoche cannot do justice 
to the complexity and internal differentiation of large swathes of peoples and territories and that there 
is a linguistic crypto-hegemony in assuming the North to be the developed world and the South as that 
to-be-developed. But we also approach the “West” as a necessary linguistic fiction for much of this 
essay, even as we try to unpack the term. We hope the ensuing discussion makes our position clear. 
 hope that some of these ideas are equally applicable in other locations where authoritarian 
states prevail. 
 
From Internationalising to de-Westernising Media Studies 
Goddard once said of film that each has a beginning, a middle and an end but not necessarily 
in that order. We might say that all societies have elements that might be called politics, 
economics and culture but not in the same arrangement. And most also have elements that 
can be called media. The issue of what exactly are the media, how to theorise and study them 
and their impacts on and interactions with the other three spheres has never been more vexed.  
 There is long-standing concern over a “Western bias” in media theory and its negative 
parochial impact (Downing, 1996). One demand has been to “internationalise” the focus of 
Media Studies beyond its heavy North Atlantic history and its strong focus on the role of 
media in supposedly functioning democracies, especially those in Europe. The aim is to take 
seriously the development of media beyond this geography and to acknowledge its perhaps 
different dynamics—of development, institutionalisation, practice and content—elsewhere, 
particularly across Africa, the Middle East and Asia. 
 Without a doubt, one of the reasons for the emergence of this demand to 
internationalise Media Studies has to do with the effects of global capitalism and the 
expansion of a transnational student population into higher education, predominantly from 
the Rest to the West, despite the despicably high costs. How could “we” continue to ignore 
the places whence they came or continue to talk about ‘their’ experiences as if identical to 
ours? It is ironic that the study of other—non-Western—people’s media has fallen under the 
rubric of “international communication”. That had been the part of Media Studies that had 
hitherto focused on the critical analysis of Western corporate expansion into non-Western 
societies, arguing that the spread of media was caught up with the putative spread of 
modernisation processes to the rest of the world; thus, media were seen to be part of the 
teleology of modernity.  
 Now, as Western academia is increasingly organised along business models, to 
produce the kind of graduates coveted by multinationals, it is imperative to interrogate the 
various agendas involved in drives towards “internationalisation”. It appears that as ever 
more foreign students study in English-speaking universities and as more non-Westerners 
have been trained in its theories and approaches, Media Studies as an academic field has had 
to confront its geographic and cultural blind spots. But, ironically, the demand to 
internationalise the curriculum supports the corporatisation of the university sector in the US, 
UK and elsewhere by which foreign students are reduced to cash cows. International 
communication is in danger of merely being the part of media studies that bothers to engage 
with non-Western societies, without any critical theorisation. As Dirlik neatly puts it: 
 
[T]he cultural requirements of transnational corporations can no longer afford the cultural 
parochialism of an earlier day. Focusing on liberal arts institutions, some conservative 
intellectuals overlook how much headway multiculturalism has made with business school 
administrators and the managers of transnational corporations, who are eager all of a sudden 
to learn the secrets of East Asian economic success in ‘oriental’ philosophies, who 
cannibalise cultures all over the world in order to better market their commodities, and who 
 have suddenly become aware of a need to internationalise academic institutions which often 
takes the form not of promoting scholarship in a conventional sense but of ‘importing’ and 
‘exporting’ students and faculty. (Dirlik, 1994, pp. 354–5) 
 
Indeed, it is important to recognise that, as national education systems have evolved around 
the world, Western definitions of academic disciplines and indeed Western intellectual 
framings of debate have been institutionalised. Sometimes this has meant that a particular and 
somewhat limited vision of “mass communication research” learned in the graduate schools 
of the US gets established in universities of the global South without much critical 
intervention. The work of Carnoy (1974) on educational imperialism comes to mind here.  
 Of course, the concern with Eurocentrism and the issues of relevance and academic 
dependency in the social sciences in the global south are nothing new. Amongst others, 
Edward Said (1979), Samir Amin (1989), Immanuel Wallerstein (1997) and Dipesh 
Chakrabarty (2000) have all examined how the ideas of “Europe” and the “Orient” were 
perceived, constructed and articulated. Not only is there epistemic dependency but, as Alatas 
(1995) rightly suggests, the existence of Orientalism and Eurocentrism cannot be separated 
from the structure of academic dependency that links core and peripheral social scientists. 
Social science became institutionalised during European expansion and later the economic 
hegemony of the United States since 1945, so that native intellectuals, trained in colonial 
languages and institutions, may share the assumptions of Orientalism and Eurocentrism. 
Often social scientists in the global South depend on external funds for research and 
development and the results are published in journals that are mostly controlled and based in 
North America and Western Europe. The inequality in wealth and power and consequences 
of the international division of labour (Alatas, 2003) is also mirrored in education and 
research, according to which “raw data” is exported from the global South to the global 
North, then shaped into theories and exported back to the South. Thandika Mkandawire, then 
president of the Council for the Development of Economic and Social Research in Africa, 
argued that “… one effect of this division of labour is that it pushes African scholars towards 
local minutiae. This might seem a commendable antidote to the extroverted [i.e., lofty 
theoretical and even other worldly] discourses on Africa, but as Hountoundji observes, even 
this focus on the local is externally driven, shaped by the needs of the ‘North’ and ends up 
reducing African researchers into ‘knowledgeable informants’” (cited in Greene, 2003: 141-
142). 
 These two parallel processes of “internationalisation”—the circulation of Western 
academic disciplines into Southern universities and the reverse flow of Southern students into 
Western universities—have produced more research and engagement with media systems and 
contemporary cultural practices beyond the “West”. This is evident in the increasing number 
of books, journal articles, conferences in the academic field that are expanding the geo-
cultural spaces of Media Studies into the Middle East, Asia and Africa. However, the demand 
for and debate around “de-Westernisation” raises other, more fundamental intellectual 
questions. 
 
Six Critical Issues Regarding de-Westernisation: 
Recently “de-Westernisation” has become a serious analytic approach in Media Studies. 
 Consider the work of Curran and Park (2000), Wang (2011) and others. It is often simply 
taken to be politically progressive and opposed to Western domination, and it is not just the 
media, but also audiences, internet, film, critical security studies, health planning and even 
the Gospel that have become the focus of “de-Westernisation”. That this analytic category 
and disciplinary frame is itself the outcome of Western theorisation is frequently overlooked, 
so that even in the attempt to escape the “West”, it is continually reinscribed in a hegemonic 
manner. Indeed, we might argue that there is no escape, no “outside” in which to find 
refuge—that will be part of the burden of the rest of our argument. 
What is often lost in this general attempt to free media from the straightjacket of 
Western media theory is any definition of the “West”, which we have so far set in quotation 
marks. “De-Westernisation”, a problematic term, seems to assume a single, homogenised and 
unified West. Equally problematic, the “non-West” is too readily established as a known and 
knowable entity. And, apparently, never the twain shall meet. In his recent book, Dabashi 
makes the bold claim that, “Our interlocutor is no longer ‘the West’, for ‘the ‘West’ is dead” 
(Dabashi, 2012: 251) He argues that the frozen binary of “the West versus the Rest” is 
finished. He suggests that it is time to move beyond the post-colonial project, which always 
cast its subjectivity as a negative response to the West, and to start embracing the new worlds 
and new possibilities that are being born. Given the first term in the quotation above, we have 
to ask from where he is speaking and presume that it is from a “non-Western” position; 
otherwise who constitutes the subject of “our/us”? Also key is his use of “the” in making the 
West a simple singularity. Even if he is hoist by his own language, Dabashi offers a radical 
invitation for us to think differently. However, he cannot intend us to ignore the ongoing 
political role of Western countries in contemporary military adventures around the world. 
Dabashi’s claim raises vividly the manner in which epistemological claims have political 
consequences or allow/refuse certain political positions.  
So a first point of critique of de-Westernisation is to ask what is this putative 
singularity, the West, and what precisely is being critiqued in this conceptual move? This 
“West” has produced the Holocaust and Hiroshima, multinational banks, the RAND 
corporation, National Endowment for Democracy and the Ku Klux Klan. But this same West 
has produced the chartist movement, the suffragettes, civil rights, women and gay 
movements, the Spanish Civil War and the Occupy movement. In the very same West exist 
numerous different countries, different socio-political trajectories and varied forms of media, 
media institutions and practices, with contradictory voices. The literature on de-
Westernisation is rather silent on these contradictions and fails to specify which geographic 
or cultural parts of the West is being invoked. At a time when even scholars from different 
corners of Europe, from Scandinavia to the Iberian peninsula, bemoan the dominance of the 
English language and Anglo-American literature in the field and are actively pursuing their 
own cultural projects, a little bit of caution in using the term ‘de-Westernisation’ can go a 
long way. 
 A second line of enquiry might raise questions about the emergence of new academic 
disciplines and their intellectual offerings. Our reading of the development of Media Studies 
runs, briefly, like this. As Western states became more complex, so a diversification of 
knowledge developed and with it the disciplining (a wonderful Foucauldian process of 
taming knowledge) of non-scientific knowledge. The early 19th Century focus on “political 
 economy” fractured into two separate and often non-communicating disciplines of Politics 
and Economics, as different departments set in different buildings of a university materialised 
the distinction. Only with the ‘global’ financial crisis of 2012-2013 has the revival of classic 
Marxist thinking reminded us of the relevance of the political system in regulating—or, more 
recently, in not regulating—the economy, the financial sector and taxation.. If Anthropology, 
a project closely linked to imperialist knowledge, remained focused on the single 
ethnographic case study of the “Other”, Sociology in its pretensions to understand itself, the 
modernising Western core, offered models of societal dynamics in which the West was 
always the winner, the most developed, the epitome of the modern. In its grand move toward 
a theory of the ‘global’, it has had little pause to rethink its foundational assumptions. The 
universal project was always profoundly—and still is—about geography. As Harvey shows, 
even John Locke recognised this: “Without knowledge of geography, gentlemen could not 
even understand a newspaper.” (Locke cited in Harvey, 2009:14) 
 Media Studies could only develop when media institutions and forms appeared 
sufficiently developed and autonomous as to warrant their own strands of analysis, even if 
these continually lead us back into political economy and issues of ownership and control or 
back toward the cultural specifics of contextualised meanings and practices. Thus, the 
foundational problem for Media Studies—as with all existing academic disciplines in their 
current configurations—is its evolution from within a specific time-space configuration of an 
idealised Western capitalist democracy, which includes the attempts to use this normative 
framework as a neutral framework for investigating practices of mediated communication in 
other parts of the world.  
 Encapsulated in the language of both “Internationalisation” and “de-Westernisation” 
lies the “spatial turn” within Media Studies, the sudden recognition—triggered perhaps by 
globalisation as both contested theory and contradictory reality—of the rest of the world and 
the role played by old and new media technologies in linking the world in various ways. So 
the understandable and necessary intellectual desire to include and analyse media systems 
beyond the dominant English-speaking environment is clear. However, the adequacy of the 
conceptual frame that has emerged to fulfil such a project is another matter.  
 The third point of our critique is that the call for a “de-Westernisation” of Media 
Studies is naïve. The blind spot of binary thinking is to ignore history, the long patterns of 
global interconnectedness that have mutually formed the West/Rest. Conquest, travel and 
‘civilising missions’ have brought together elements of material culture (food, including 
sugar, tea, coffee, spices; ceramics and pottery; textiles, clothing, carpets; aesthetic practices 
and art forms), as well as more abstract elements such as shared religious, spiritual and 
aesthetic values and cultural practices. Bulliet’s recent (2004) attempt to address Islamo-
Christian interactions is exemplary. Islam has a strong presence in London’s Whitechapel, 
while there are many Buddhists in Brooklyn.  
 Surely the entire history of the world is a history of encounters, adoptions and 
adaptations, so that the West/Rest do not suddenly discover each other on a particular date, 
but have known each other forever and are always already imbricated? Certainly, these 
encounters have not always been staged on an equal footing and the last long period of 
human history has been heavily biased toward different forms of Western power. But a 
political desire to produce a new form of knowledge is insufficient to guarantee the clarity of 
 the paradigm. 
 Fourth, “de-Westernisation” seems to suggest that the theory and methods of Media 
Studies and broader social theory offer nothing of use outside their original birthplaces. Is 
there nothing of use to be gained from the works of, say, Williams, Habermas and Bourdieu 
in discussing and understanding media culture in the global South? It seems to us that 
explorations of concepts such as the “public sphere”, the “everyday” and “taste cultures” are 
not irrelevant in the non-West, even if they present themselves in different formations and 
locations. These ideas prompt discussion about what constitutes the ‘public’, how and by 
whom is “taste” defined and what does the “everyday” mean under different discursive 
regimes. Attempts to critique the universal pretence of media theory seem to draw a 
completely parallel universe in which non-Western media and culture are necessarily and 
distinctly different from the West. The emergence of Bayat’s notion of “lived politics”, for 
example, might be seen precisely as a critical engagement with Western theorisation and the 
development of a concept that comes out of a non-Western political context. 
 Connell has neatly synthesised some of the problems with the “northernness of 
general theory” thus: 
 
The consequences of metropolitan geo-political location can be seen…in four characteristic 
textual moves: the claim of universality; reading from the centre; gestures of exclusion; and 
grand erasure. (Connell, 2007: 44)  
 
We might quickly—and perhaps ironically—note that the terms in which Connell frames the 
issues are themselves classic Western articulations—but that, in itself, is not a bad thing! Let 
us gloss each of her points briefly. First the claim of universality—a term that shares an 
etymological root with university—is seen to be at the heart of social theory, depending on 
the assumption that all societies are knowable and knowable in the same way and from the 
same point of view. The idea that this very point of view originates in the metropole is not 
explicit—indeed, in Barthian terms, it is exnominated—whereas argument generated 
elsewhere is deprived of universality because its local specificity is named as such; for 
example, in “African philosophy”. Second, theory as developed in the West often thinks of 
time in abstract terms, as date-free and continuous—while the histories of most colonial 
experiences are of discontinuity and abrupt change. Third, authors from the periphery are 
rarely read and even more rarely acknowledged in the West. Fourth, since social theory is 
built in dialogue with empirical knowledge, when it is built on the basis solely of 
metropolitan experience, it erases the experiences of the majority of the world from the 
foundations of social thought. 
 It appears that recent claims to “de-Westernise” media studies are somewhat stalled. 
Curran and Park (2000) merely offer an untheorised model of political, rather than media, 
differences that hardly develops the debate. Hallin and Mancini are critical enough of their 
attempt to expand their model of media comparison beyond the Western democracies whence 
it originated to note “that this enterprise involved a kind of contradiction; it ran the risk of 
producing exactly the kind of universalising extension of our framework we hoped to avoid” 
(2012: 3). Interestingly, this growing awareness is still mainly conducted in English and 
 expressed mostly in American and British journals,3 part of the Anglo-American academic-
industrial complex.  
 So a fifth point in our argument is the conceptual danger of nativism. The quest for 
“authenticity”, assertions of cultural difference and attempts to formulate “native” 
conceptions of knowledge, all too often reduce forms of culture and identity into singular and 
all-inclusive constructs. A parallel process is to construct ‘insiders’ as having better 
knowledge and understanding than ‘outsiders’, no matter what theoretical approach they use. 
This implies that a literal standing-in-place is better than a symbolic standing in theory or 
politics, rendering the de-Westernising of subject areas—especially Media Studies—the 
preserve of indigenous elites. But we have already discussed the education and 
institutionalisation of local elites as itself coloured by Western educations and experiences.  
 A reductive nativisation, as Dirlik explains, “reveals the impossibility of sustaining 
reified, holistic notions of traditions, which already have been transformed by modernity, and 
appear most prominently as sites of conflict between different social interests and different 
visions of the modern” (2003: 286). Such cultural turns in recent years appear anti-modern 
and apparently reject modernity but they should be seen precisely as attempts to reconstruct 
modernity according to particular regional models. Capitalist modernity in its current stage, 
as Dirlik has argued, “has had to interiorize cultural difference as part of its very constitution; 
one fundamental consequence of which has been to compromise its identification with Euro-
American models of modernity, which provided an earlier modernization discourse with its 
teleological power” (2002: 17). In this sense, cultural traditions that were assigned to the 
dustbin of history in earlier versions of modernisation have seen a significant development in 
recent years. For example, the Confucian revival in China, alongside the revival of Hinduism 
in India, Buddhism in other Asian countries, Islam in much of the Middle East, as well as the 
revival of a Pan-Turanian utopia in Turkey all point not to a “singular” Asia, nor to a unified 
“Islamic World”, but rather to diverse cultural claims to modernity. As Dirlik (2002) 
suggests: 
 
[T]oo much preoccupation with Eurocentrism or colonialism also disguises fundamental 
questions of contemporary modernity that cut across so-called cultural divides, especially as 
the locations of modernity and culture are themselves thrown into question with the 
reconfigurations of economic and political organisation globally. Differences framed in terms 
of geographical or spatial cultural locations serve above all to conceal the fact that these are 
the least important differences that may matter in an age of globalisation. They are no less 
anachronistic than the persistence of Three Worlds idea, which informed an earlier 
modernisation discourse, but they do serve a purpose in the containment of difference. 
 
The turn toward nativism is sometimes a consequence of the call for “indigenisation” of the 
                                                
3 Such works include a special edition of the journal Media, Culture and Society, Vol. 15(1) (2003) on 
Islam and Communication; Javnost/Public, Vol. 8(2) (2001), dedicated to Media and Democracy in 
Asia; Asian Journal of Communication, Vol. 10(2) (2000); Global Media and Communication, Vol. 
3(3) (2007); a major conference entitled “Internationalising Media Studies: Imperatives and 
Impediments”, hosted by University of Westminster in 2006; as well as numerous conference panels, 
seminars, not to mention scores of books and articles. 
 social sciences, another response to purported academic dependency and mental captivity. 
Indigenisation, as Alatas argues, 
 
. . . is an amorphous term. It refers neither to a theoretical perspective nor to an intellectual 
movement. Rather, it is a loose category that subsumes the works of various authors from a 
wide variety of disciplines in the human sciences, all of which are concerned with the 
problem of irrelevancy and the generation of alternative scientific tradition. (1995: 128) 
 
The concern nevertheless goes beyond providing amendments to the parochialism of 
Eurocentrism, since there are calls for autonomous social science traditions that generate 
knowledge, concepts and methodologies rooted in a non-Western context. But within this 
international call to practise relevant social science and to decolonise it, there exists a 
“nativist” tendency. Sometimes there is a crude ad hominem presupposition that local 
academics and intellectuals will produce better local knowledge, as if the international 
dynamics of higher education, dominance of certain paradigms of thinking and social 
scientific methodologies have not already exacted their toll on creative local thought.  
 This leads to our sixth critique which centres on the problem of essentialising culture 
as a determinate object, an argument developed by both Fabian (1991) and Hobart (1990). 
One example of such an approach was a special edition of Media, Culture and Society (Vol. 
15:1, 1993), which wanted to “interpret differences of systems of thought with greater 
understanding and finesse”. This was explained in the introduction that blithely utilises a 
number of essentialising categories: 
 
In this issue, for increasingly obvious reasons, we have taken the risk of trying to dig into 
some of the roots of current cultural clashes between the Muslim world and the West. Thus, 
for the first time in a major, Western English-language media and cultural studies journal, we 
have attempted to put together a collection of analyses of communication and culture by 
Muslim Scholars and have also sought comments from a leading politician and a prominent 
religious leader. Our focus, naturally, is upon conceptions of communication as they are 
theorised by Muslims. (Media, Culture and Society, 1993, p. 5) 
 
It should not be necessary to say that not all Muslims think the same way. Yet, as Khiabany 
(2011) pointed out, the issue offered five contributions from scholars and politicians from 
only two countries, Iran and Pakistan, to be representative of “communication as . . . 
theorised by Muslims”. Nor would all Muslim women think in that same way; yet, as 
Sreberny argued (1993), none had been invited to write for this special issue.  
 Perhaps no region of the world has been so theoretically strung out between Western 
notions of modernity and indigenous notions of tradition than the “Middle East”, a colonial 
construct par excellence (Sreberny, 2008). Before the year of magical activity in the Middle 
East—2011—the dominant Western conceptual approach was to problematise the “lack of 
democracy in the region in terms of the stubbornness of ‘tradition’ and the ‘backwardness of 
Islamic civilisation’ to explain ‘what went wrong?’” (Lewis, 2002). In this influential mode 
of thinking, Islam gets treated as a coherent, self-sealed and self-explanatory culture and as 
the main obstacle in front of Islamic countries seeking full membership of the exclusive club 
of ‘modernity’. Reproducing the old stories of the incompatibility of ‘Islam’ with 
 ‘modernity’, Lewis argued: “The absence of a native secularism in Islam, and the widespread 
Muslim rejection of an imposed secularism inspired by Christian example, may be attributed 
to certain profound differences of belief and experiences in the two religious cultures” (2002: 
10). This repetition of modernisation theory fails to acknowledge that the question of 
religious revival is not simply a question for Islam, since it is alive and kicking in many 
countries including in the US. It is not so much an issue of the clash of tradition with the 
modern, but the increased visibility of religion’s involvement in the clash over the nature of 
global modernity.4  
 The response in the “Islamic world” to this vision of historical development has been 
two-fold. Many share the basic assumption of Lewis and others and have begun the process 
of “self-examination”, mapping religious/cultural traits as the key reason for failure in their 
engagement with modernity (Matin-Asgari, 2004). Others, while challenging the 
Eurocentrism of “Islamic Studies” and pointing out neglect in recording the contribution of 
“Islamic civilisation” in science and economy, do share the basic assumption of the 
“uniqueness” of “Islamic” culture and civilisation. Such an interpretive or explanatory 
strategy is also evident in the call for the ‘Islamisation’ of knowledge which is part of a much 
broader historical trend to Islamicise the social sciences and sociology (Zaidi, 2006; Gole, 
2000) and to effect a reconstruction of knowledge from a specifically “Muslim” perspective.  
 However, behind much of the current discussion about the conflict between 
fundamentalist Islam and the secular, modern West lie highly romantic and ahistorical 
notions of both Islamic culture and of the West itself. Many commentators claim that the 
Middle East is unique; that religion has remained a central and defining feature of the 
“Islamic World”; that there is a unified history and identity of Islamic culture; that the study 
of this “history” and “culture” demonstrates, beyond doubt, the incompatibility of Islam and 
Muslims with modernity; and that for all these reasons the Muslim world remains an 
“exceptional” case. The conflation of the construct of the Middle East with the “Islamic 
World” was always problematic, but even more so now as the centre of gravity of the 
“Islamic World” has shifted east into Asia, to Malaysia and Indonesia (Khalidi, 2003).  
 To play with the Englishism for a moment, the construction of a political imaginary 
named “the Middle East” only made sense if one was looking out from a London/Paris axis 
to the world; but equally, it relied on another pre-established notion, of the “Far East’, from 
which it was to be distinguished. The “Middle East” was at the centre of the ancient Silk 
Road along which continental and maritime trade routes linked the old empire of China to 
Europe through India, and the Middle East itself looked East as much as West. The route was 
so named by the German geographer Ferdinand von Richthofen in 1877 just as European 
imperialism imposed new territorial divisions that subsequent nationalist movements would 
later reinscribe. 
 We do not wish to deny a critique of “Eurocentric” historiography, which has ignored 
and neglected the immense contribution by others to what we would like to call “human 
                                                
4 This, of course, has consequences not only for academic scholarship. It lies behind and drives 
political strategies to ‘bring democracy’ to the region, and in Europe in the context of ‘war on terror’ 
feeds and encourages anti-Muslim racism. For a good analysis of the illiberal rage of liberal 
intellectuals against Islam, see Kundnani (2008).  
 civilisation”. However, by organising and arranging the world in such neat units (all 
appearing to possess some unbroken cultural unity and continuity), we only reproduce, by 
accident or design, the very “Islamic Studies” that has been under attack at least since the 
publication of Said’s Orientalism. Thus, writing on Islamic Studies and the European 
Imagination, Al-Azmeh has argued: 
 
To this schematization of the self corresponds the schematism of the other. Each of these 
schemata is a topic which is invariably called forth to schematize things that are observed 
Islamic. Thus there are ‘Islamic cities’ unlike all other cities, ‘Islamic economies’ to which 
economic reason is inapplicable, ‘Islamic polities’ impenetrable to social sciences and 
political sense, ‘Islamic history’ to which normal equipment of historical research is not 
applied. Facts are disassociated from their historical, social, cultural and other contexts, and 
reduced to this substantive Islamism of European imagination. (1993: 139) 
 
Or as Dirlik has rightly argued, “It is one of the profound ironies of our times that modernity 
should be in question more seriously than ever before at the very moment of its apparent 
global victory” (2003: 275). 
 If the critique of Eurocentrism and the parochialism of the social sciences is a 
“corrective” act and an expression of solidarity with the “non-West”, the reception and 
articulation of this critique in the political dynamics of the global South reveals yet more 
contradictions. The advocates of “Islamic communication theory”, more or less, belong in 
this camp and many of the contradictions of such an approach can be seen in the history of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
The Iranian Revolution and the Invention of the Islamic Republic 
Iran and the Iranian revolution is often presented as a significant example of the success of 
the “indigenous”, with the transfer of power to a new Islamic theocratic ruling elite viewed as 
the revenge of ‘tradition on modernity’ (Mowlana and Wilson, 1990). That Iran had an older 
indigenous tradition, most often defined by Zoroastrianism, that Islam was brought in by 
Arab conquest and that the Safavids invented Shi’ism as an idea and practice that separated 
them from the Ottoman Empire and the Arabs is usefully forgotten—but part of a complex 
history that we cannot flesh out further here.  
 The Islamic Republic as articulated by Ayatollah Khomeni was to take on an identity 
in distinction to the “corrupt West”, the “great Satan” of the United States and its predatory 
political and degenerate culture. Thus, the conceptual rhetoric of the West/Rest binary—or 
the “de-Westernisation paradigm”—also became a global political paradigm as used by the 
Islamic Republic.  
 Mowlana, once a professor of international communication in the USA, became a key 
media policy-maker of the Islamic Republic and helped the development of the rhetoric. His 
trajectory from US-based media scholar to lieutenant of a repressive hegemon is a fascinating 
one. In Mowlana’s “Islamic” response to the “Western” model of communication, one 
supposedly more in tune with the cultural values and history of the Islamic World, the nation-
state is counterposed to the Islamic community, the Umma (community of the faithful in an 
undifferentiated ‘Islam’ (Khiabany, 2011) Mowlana brushes aside the material realities of 
 capitalist modernity, since in the Islamic model “the central question is not one of economics 
but of culture, ethics, and tabligh” (Mowlana, 1996: 126). For him, Tabligh (propagation is 
based on Tawhid (monotheism), which implies the “unity, coherence and harmony” of the 
universe … It stands for the necessity of exclusive servitude to and … negates any right of 
sovereignty and guardianship over human society to anyone except God (Mowlana, 1996: 
119–20). This is the ultimate fetishism of difference that oddly reproduces the Orientalist 
understanding of “Islam”. In its questioning of the relevance of “Western” social sciences, 
such an approach also questions the relevance of the agencies and subjectivities of all social 
groups and classes other than the ulema—undermining the twin pillars of velayat-e-faghih 
and public participation that ground the Islamic Republic—and denies the inclusion of 
identities based on anything other than the binary of believers and non-believers.  
 By relegating politics to a realm of “culture”, by dehistoricising and decontextualising 
“culture”, by elevating text (holy books) over context, and ideas and the social imaginary 
over material and social realities, by imagining a past and an authenticity that never was, such 
claims to difference only succeed in suppressing the internal differences within such a 
perceived singular “culture”. This denial of nations, histories, locations and contexts thus 
shows itself in the idea of Islamic communication theory. “Islamic” communication theory is 
neither about the media that are owned by people who are Muslims, nor about those media 
that are designed for consumption or consumed by Muslims. None of these, as we shall see, 
makes a channel or a media product “Islamic”. What advocates of “Islamic communication” 
do offer (despite some clear differences in their emphasis and “identity”) is reinforcement of 
the binaristic division of the world into two overly neat categories of the God-fearing Islam 
and the secular West. Mowlana (1990, 1993, 1994, 1996), Pasha (1993), Sardar (1993), 
Ayish (2003) and others have tried to free communication theory from its enslavement to 
Western conceptual orientations and elaborate instead a singular “Islamic perspective on 
communication”. Thus, they neatly erode the long history of intra-Muslim conflicts (one 
form of which is currently being played out with some relish by Western media as the 
“Sunni-Shiite conflict”) so that the construction of a singular Islamic perspective is too 
readily achieved. The paradox of the critique of Orientalism is a reproduction of limited and 
banal postures and a fixation in a dehistoricised frozen binary from which there appears no 
escape. Hence, the call for indigenisation is too vague, creating a simple mirror opposite of 
Eurocentrism, and failing to point to a convincing range of examples. It is then no surprise 
that scholars affiliated to a notion of Islamic communication give very little analysis of the 
struggle for control over the interpretation of “culture”, or of communicative resources, or of 
the system of social stratification.  
 Such assertions of cultural differences, as the case of Iran demonstrates, also leave the 
door open for the manipulation of political power and repressive measures used 
indiscriminately against Muslims and non-Muslims, secularists and believers, natives and 
non-natives. A key element of essentialist thinking is reductionism: that is, the reduction of 
all other identities such as class, gender, ethnicity, regional and political allegiances to one 
inclusive identity. Within this narrative there is only one way of “imagining community” and 
that is by religion.  
 
Beyond the False Binary: New Voices Inside the Islamic Republic 
 What interests us is the way the much vaunted theory of “de-Westernisation” is played out in 
the policy and practices of the Islamic Republic, a pre-eminent test case for “Islamic 
nativism”. Here is the ultimate marriage of a conceptual framework stemming from the West, 
albeit by academics and intellectuals trying to push for a theoretically progressive approach, 
with a political project of anti-Westernism by an authoritarian state. This project turns in the 
end not only on the blocking of Western ideas and cultural product, but also on the stymying 
of internal opposition voices who try to build democratic capacity inside the country. It turns 
into a model that Gramsci would have recognised well, the appearance of a hegemonic 
system which—neither very far behind, nor concealed—wields a powerful surveillance and 
coercive system designed to correct any breaks of conformity. 
 Dominated by fears of “cultural imperialism” and penetration, latterly renamed as the 
promotion of “Velvet Revolution”, the Islamic Republic has eschewed most Western cultural 
forms and products. It promotes a particular form of Shi’ite authoritarianism through Islamic 
Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the national broadcaster, the key ideological 
organisation that offers numerous radio and television channels, book publishing and film 
production to address different audience niche needs.5 IRIB also maintains a significant 
external broadcasting arm in various languages, including Arabic and English, while its 
international English-language Press TV supposedly “provides a voice for the voiceless”. 
 But the Islamic Republic has confused the form with the content, so in its paranoia 
about “cultural threat”, it has variously banned the very technologies themselves as carriers 
of unwanted material. So satellite dishes are illegal, although it is estimated that around 70 
per cent of the population has a dish. And in the concern to prevent “Western” cultural 
content entering the country, little attention is paid to the many channels of pornography 
produced by many “Islamic” Middle Eastern countries and readily available on the multi-
channel television packages available to Iranian audiences. While Iranian traditional music is 
now allowed, many contemporary forms of music are not, driving a lively scene literally 
underground. Dance is proscribed, theatre limited and non-representational art barely 
tolerated (Sreberny and Torfeh, 2013). Cartoonists and bloggers, publishers and film-makers 
have all run into problems, newspapers and journals have been closed and personnel 
imprisoned, even executed.  
 But intra-elite contestation has meant that not only cultural forms that might be 
construed as ‘originally’ Western have been constrained, but actually much of the worst 
invective and control has been meted out to participants within the Islamic Republic who do 
not share the specific political vision of the powers-that-be. Thus, the late Ayatollah 
Motazeri, conservative newspapers and religious bloggers have all been censored. While 
fearful of new technologies coming from outside, these have been readily used to broadcast 
confessions recorded under torture from Iranian prisons. 
 Ironically, none of this much affects Western cultural producers who have domestic 
and international markets galore and who find their way into Iran anyway (viz. Murdoch’s 
Farsi One television channel). However, it does severely restrict the cultural habits and tastes 
                                                
5  Such internal differentiation reminds us of the oft-quoted idea of propaganda, supposedly from 
Goebbels: “What you want in a media system is ostensible diversity that conceals an actual 
uniformity.” 
 of Iranians. But the young are Internet adepts and school themselves well with illegal 
downloads of music, film, pornography, etc. The black market is flooded with film DVDs 
and music CDs, often of the most up-to-date releases, many of which are readily available in 
city bazaars. And beyond the policing of cultural consumption (Sreberny and Khiabany, 
2010) lies an extensive fabric of social control, of the policing of everyday life and the 
surveillance of anything deemed oppositional. These cat-and-mouse politics between the 
State and the people has produced a schizoid mode of living where maintaining appearances 
in public is vital for a quiet life, while many people have found ways to satisfy a range of 
desires quietly within their private homes. 
 But alternative perspectives have developed within the Islamic Republic that provide 
a location for internal critique, as well of external critique, that is to say, positions which 
cannot be swallowed up by either metropolitan universality or nativist hegemony. These two 
positions are feminism and the development of a civil society voice, positions that are closely 
intertwined. These have developed over the past three decades of the Islamic Republic as the 
key sites of resistance to an Islamicised fundamentalism that often masquerades as anti-
Western nativism. 
 
Gender and Civil Society as the Internal Oppositional Voices 
Clearly “gender discrimination” is one of the easiest critiques that outside pontificators can 
make of so-called Islamic societies. But equally, the “de-Westernising” argument has been 
remarkably silent about gender or minority politics within Southern societies, preferring to 
use notions of homogeneous culture. We could cite the misuse of the plight of Afghani 
women and the struggle of RAWA and other organisations by Western politicos, including 
Laura Bush, in support of US imperialist adventure. Our critique would make the point that 
this struggle was long-standing but ignored until it became useful for the West to 
acknowledge it; and equally, by focusing on the struggle that might be pragmatically 
relevant, the similar plight of women in other locations (Palestine, for example) is still 
ignored. On the other hand, we are also well aware of the simplistic rejection of women’s 
demands by authoritarian regimes since feminist struggles are ‘Western’. 
 We do not wish to fall into either trap. There are long histories of women’s struggles 
in Iran and the wider region. The real significance of the women’s movement since 1979 is 
its raising of a wide set of issues about gender relations and inequality that includes not only 
familial issues such as marriage, divorce and child custody, but also labour laws, political 
participation, lack of independent judiciary, etc. We have written elsewhere (Sreberny and 
Khiabany, 2010) about the 30-year history of the Islamic Republic, its wars and economic 
circumstances that have propelled women into the frontlines of political struggle. In relation 
to the media, we have documented the emergence of a women’s press, women bloggers 
(Sreberny and Khiabany, 2010) and the manner in which women’s demands for their human 
rights is part of a broader struggle for communicative rights inside Iran (Sreberny, 
forthcoming). Women make up over 60 per cent of university students and have not been 
prone to Western cultural stereotypes, choosing to study hard sciences, nuclear physics and 
mechanical engineering. However, suddenly in the summer of 2012, the Islamic Republic 
decided to proscribe over 70 university subjects to women, impose gender segregation and 
insist that women to remain in their home town to study. What would be a “de-Westernised” 
 agenda in support of women’s rights? How might we understand such a system if not through 
the analytic lens of authoritarian neo-patriarchy?  
 
The Emergence of Civil Society  
Crucially, the women’s movement has to be seen as part of the emergence of broader civil 
society politics in Iran. This was developing before the 1979 Revolution that was its 
triumphal moment. It was pushed back only to became even more significant in the reform 
period in the 1990s, inspired by both national and international histories and struggles, 
theories and authors. The emergence of labour politics, the student movement, increasingly 
even gay rights are all “indigenous” but draw inspiration from many diverse sources. The 
‘de-Westernising’ argument, like Orientalism, suggests a horizontal methodological 
nationalism of national cultures doing battle, while the vertical power politics within many 
societies gets overlooked by both. 
Inside Iran, there is a growing cacophony of civil society voices raising questions 
about corruption, incompetence and making these public. Despite the evident repression, 
there are many voices—male and female—in newspapers, magazines, blogging and making 
music and art, raising political issues and attacking the definition and the practice of the 
‘indigenous’ politics of the Islamic Republic. The index of the political tragedy of the Islamic 
Republic is the number of journalists, editors, bloggers, women’s activists, trade union 
organisers, lawyers, intellectuals who have been killed, have been and are imprisoned, placed 
under house arrest and otherwise rendered unable to promote public discussion about a wide 
range of social and political issues. It is in this context that Press TV’s claim rings with a 
hypocritical hollowness and the arguments about “cultural imperialism” or “soft war” are 
spurious when the main opponents are the internal critics. 
This does not mean that there is no external intervention happening. The “sanctions 
regime” headed by the US and EU is having a devastating impact on the daily lives of many 
Iranians.6 Iran is perhaps the only nation to have felt the brunt of new international forms of 
“cyber-warfare” through the Stuxnet, Flame and Duqu viruses; and there have been a number 
of assassinations of Iranian scientists on the streets of Iran. A Media Studies that extends to 
such issues of cyber-warfare has to recognise that the combatants are not simply the US vs. 
Islamic Republic, but also the Islamic Republic vis-à-vis many of its people. The third 
position that gender politics and civil society voices articulate feels the brunt of both 
imperialism and dictatorship. 
 In its effort to present itself as a bulwark against US intervention in the Muslim 
world, Iran rhetorically spins its ability to withstand sanctions as a moral victory against 
imperialism, while quietly moving forward with its neoliberal economic policies, ever-
increasing militarisation and suppression of opposition at home. Those close to the regime 
are benefitting hugely. Porsche have noted that it sold more cars to Tehran in 2011 than 
anywhere else. Just as in the Iraqi case, US-led sanctions make grassroots democratic dissent 
much more difficult for ordinary Iranians living in Iran. At the same time, the Iranian 
government has only tightened its control on the flow of wealth and information in the 
                                                
6 “Sanctions against Iran: a duplicitous “alternative” to war: 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/5518/sanctions-against-iran_a-duplicitous-alternative-t.   
 country, while the economy dances to the movement of the dollar as never before. In the 
conflict between empire and dictatorship, there is a great need for a third way beyond the 
militaristic dance of macabre state-led politics-as-usual. (For a powerful critique of the lack 
of class analysis in post-colonial theory and the ‘specter of capital’, see Chibber, 2013) 
 
Conclusion 
The massive amount of engineering required to maintain the appearance of a monolithic 
Islamic totality suppresses the recognition of internal diversity, not only across a world 
religion such as Islam, but within a single polity such as the Islamic Republic. Middle Eastern 
regional exceptionalism opts for a fragmentary mode of analysis and produces culturalist 
narratives that ignore the broader context of cultural production in particular and capitalist 
modernity in general. By choosing to focus on ‘culture’, these narratives not only fail to 
tackle the question of whose culture, thereby ignoring the fact that culture has always been a 
site of struggle, but they also separate the question of the ‘everyday’ from the question of 
political economy. That danger runs through all simplistic articulations of de-Westernisation, 
as manifest perhaps in notions of “Asian values” or Hindutva as the expression of Indianess; 
thus the Iranian case is merely an illustration of politico-cultural issues that have to be 
addressed in many parts of Asia. 
 Culture, as Ahmad (2004) has argued, is not just about the past and inheritance, but 
also about the future (the generation of meanings) and societies are always contradictory 
totalities of practices, struggles and disputes over imaginings of the future, as well as 
narratives of the past. Eurocentrism as an intellectual tradition emerged not just in Europe, 
but in capitalist Europe. The spread of Eurocentrism has accompanied the global spread of 
capitalism. By diverting criticism of capitalism to criticism of Eurocentrism, shifting 
attention from political economy (the political, economic and social) to culture, and replacing 
equality with identity, the advocates of Islamic exceptionalism reveal their own ideological 
limitations. The challenge to Eurocentrism has to take place not just in the site of culture.  
 Connell has asked, and not simply rhetorically, “can we have social theory that does 
not claim universality for a metropolitan point of view, does not read from only one direction, 
does not exclude the experience and social thought of most of humanity, and is not 
constructed on terra nullius?” (2007: 47) But she disavows any simplistic return to forms of 
nativism that have occasionally been put forward as the antidote to Western conceptual 
dominance. 
 We have suggested that the voices, demands and practices of women and civil society 
in Iran, ordinary people—are the real ‘contradiction’ to an authoritarian political structure, 
not Hollywood cinema or British television. This challenge will be centered in new forms of 
citizenship and practice, perhaps in a new cosmopolitan ethos as Dabashi (2012) has put it, 
that transcends the redundant East/West binary and actually imagines—and perhaps 
produces—something new. 
 The rhetorical politics of the imperious binary of the “West/Rest” suggests that 
nothing “positive” stems from the former, but also that the “Rest” is always benign and 
progressive. Is it not more important to pay attention to real politics and the shape of power 
relations on the ground within societies and across international boundaries? The challenge 
for social analysts is to find a conceptual footing between imperialist intervention on the one 
 hand and non-Western exceptionalism on the other, a critical “Third Voice” that goes beyond 
the binary divide.  
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